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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION
Although Taiwan's flourishing economy, with continuous 
high rates of economic growth in recent years, has been 
acclaimed throughout the world as a modern miracle— one of 
Asia's Four Dragons^--most western people may not know why 
Taiwan enthusiastically plays an active role within the 
fabric of complicated and competitive international trade 
despite the country's scarce natural resources and high 
population density. First, this paper introduces The Taiwan 
Model in economic development. It explores and analyzes the 
impact of the Chinese background on the modern Taiwan 
businessman's behavior. The environmental internal and 
external influences on Taiwan's foreign trade, which include 
land reform, population change, and the relationship of 
substantial diplomacy with foreign countries, are discussed 
as well. The paper also briefly describes the key points of 
Taiwan's economic achievements on international trade.
Taiwan presently is worried about a number of barriers 
which undermine the country's trading capabilities. These 
trading bottlenecks— the trade-surplus with the United 
States, dependence on imports from Japan, commercial 
counterfeiting problems, and pressure as a result of massive
1
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foreign exchange reserves— are examined in detail. Finally, 
Taiwan's future international trade prospects are considered 
in relation to strong competition from South Korea and 
effects of the open door policy of mainland China.
Whether or not other developing countries can duplicate 
Taiwan's experience is debatable. Admittedly, the impact of 
the Republic of China on Taiwan the past 30 plus years 
has been considerable. This paper provides clues for 
those concerned about the prospects of Taiwan's future 
foreign trade.
Taiwan, a small island with an area of 13,885 square 
miles, is slightly smaller than Switzerland, the 
Netherlands, or the combined area of Massachusetts and 
Connecticut. With a population of 19 million, limited 
arable land, and few natural resources, the disparity of 
incomes between the top wage earners and those at the bottom 
was reduced in 1985 to 4.36 to 1 from 15 to 1 in the 1950s. 
Thus the majority of the people are middle c l a s s . 2
Taiwan's economic development could be traced first, 
from 1895 to 1945, the period of Japanese colonization, and 
second, from 1951 to 1965, the period of United States 
economic aid. During the former, the Japanese did not 
intend to develop Taiwan's industry to a high degree. Their 
concentration was on developing agricultural raw materials 
which could be exported to Japan to support Japanese 
industrialization.3 Nonetheless, the 50 years of Japanese
2
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rule on Taiwan were typified by colonized economic 
development along with rigid political control.
During the second period. United States aid assisted 
Taiwan socially, militarily, and economically. The aid 
primarily helped recover Taiwan's postwar economy and it 
controlled inflation in the early 1950s. The aid also 
inaugurated a favorable climate for private investments 
or enterprises which were free to concentrate on 
labor-intensive processing industries. This gave Taiwan a 
great advantage in international trade.^ Japan and the 
United States still are Taiwan's major trading partners in 
the global economy.
In 1949 the Nationalists withdrew from mainland China. 
Their failure to carry out land reform envisioned by 
Dr. Sun Yat-sen, father of the Republic of China, 
led to a great urgency to formulate and implement a 
series of agricultural development programs which 
consolidated the future foundation of industrialization and 
provided the incentives necessary for the island's economic 
growth. Subsequently, under prudent economic development 
strategies during the 1960s and early 1970s, several Export 
Processing Zones (where imported raw materials and 
intermediate goods were processed into finished goods for 
export) were established to attract foreign capital and 
accelerate the rate of export expansion.^
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Chapter 2
THE TAIWAN MODEL IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
Impact of Traditional Chinese Characteristics 
on Modernized Businessmen's Behaviors
The Chinese traditional philosophy of life emphasizes a 
close family system, a great respect for education, and the 
brotherhood of man. As an ethical system, Confucianism has 
served the Chinese well for 2500 years and has become a 
paramount force in Chinese traditional culture. Today 
most Chinese in Taiwan, regardless of their specific 
religious affiliations, or lack of them, are affected 
behaviorally and attitudinally by Confucianism.^
Due to rapid industrialization and westernization, 
Taiwan's society has changed which, in turn, has influenced 
the people's standards of value judgments. Businessmen 
particularly face challenges imposed by changing social and 
material environments. In terms of moral and social 
responsibilities, the thinking of the people has remained 
virtually unchanged as they have attempted to adapt to an 
evolving society combining old traditions with new ideas.
Since the Chinese in Taiwan are deeply affected by 
traditional culture, Confucian teachings stressing loyalty, 
forgiveness, and moderation— the guiding principles of
4
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life— are deeply rooted in the minds of the people. The 
family unit continues to be the nucleus of society. Filial 
piety is considered a cardinal virtue. The Chinese approach 
to human relationships is learned in the family: children
are taught to respect their parents at home, teachers in 
school, and elder people in society. These attitudes 
radiate from the family to the whole of society.^
The traditional Chinese concept, based on Confucianism, 
emphasizes the obligation of children to parents, and young 
people to elder people. Accordingly, the young in an 
organization or company must comply with traditional rules 
that require expressing a deferential demeanor to their 
superiors and heeding their opinions in decision making. 
Under these circumstances, what Taiwan's businessmen display 
in the face of strong competition in international trade is 
a kind of teamwork more than individual performance.
Friendliness and personal warmth are important also. 
There is an old Confucian saying: "It is a joy for a friend
to come from afar." This has been rephrased by businessmen 
in Taiwan: "A buyer from far away received to dinner at a 
restaurant is a worthwhile affair." For businessmen in 
Taiwan, eating is more than a biological necessity; they 
prefer to settle bargains around a dinner table than around 
an office conference table. This involves much mutual 
inviting and yielding, and the seating must be just right. 
Via formal and informal dinners, Chinese businessmen
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
strive to increase their understanding of one another and 
make good trades.
Adoring nature is another traditional characteristic 
of most Chinese. They extol the harmony of humanity and 
nature, attempt to apply it to their personalities, and 
imitate it in their calligraphy. This adaptation to the 
physical environment has greatly influenced Chinese culture 
and behavior.®
For instance, written language in China began with 
simple pictographs which represented objects. Many 
present-day Chinese characters have evolved from these 
pictographs. Moon, written as , developed from the 
ancient |) . Other examples are the sun, formerly (T) , 
now E? ; mountain, formerly , now lIj ; water, formerly , 
now . Many basic pictographs have been extended or 
combined to form ideographs. Sun,^  , and moon, , 
together,0j^ , mean bright, illustrious, and clear. A tree,
, d o u b l e d , , forms the character for forest. If 
tripled, , the character means a dense forest.® The 
process of character evolution from pictograph to 
ideograph illustrates that the Chinese are good at 
imitating and that they abound in imagination.
In addition, duplicating Chinese characters challenges 
the artistic imagination. The making of a good calligrapher 
is a slow and arduous process. It requires many years of 
copying old masters before one can create a style of one's
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
own and be labeled a true calligrapher. Alas, the ancients 
would be dismayed that this imitation process has resulted 
in distorted thinking among modernized businessmen in 
Taiwan. Many copy hot-selling consumer products for profit 
even when their actions are illegal or they are violating 
business ethics.
The Chinese background, steeped in traditions, has 
generated positive and negative effects on modern 
businessmen in Taiwan. The Chinese in general, not only 
businessmen, continuously maintain their traditional culture 
while assimilating outside cultures. How to combine the 
best of the traditional and the new cultures, and promote 
the businessmen's social responsibilities and ethics, is the 
basis of this study.
Environmental Influences
Success in international trade has earned Taiwan 
an honored title : Newly Industrialized Country of Asia.
Why has Taiwan been so successful in comparison to others?
It has been suggested that Taiwan's unfavorable economic 
geographic factors and lack of natural resources have more 
than been compensated by an abundance of human resources.
It also has been suggested that the country's close 
proximity to mainland China, shadowed by Communist 
dictatorship, has forced Taiwan to increase its strength 
via the pursuit of foreign trade as a means of survival.
7
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Internal Factors
The island of Taiwan is 244 miles long from tip to tip 
and 89 miles wide at the broadest point. Its northern 
extremity is 655 miles southwest of Japan and its southern 
tip is 225 miles north of the Philippines. Although the 
soil is fertile and the climate is favorable, only one 
fourth of the island is suitable for cultivation. The 
remaining terrain is mountainous, covered by forests of 
indifferent commercial value. Taiwan's important natural 
resources are coal, limestone, and natural gas, present in 
insufficient quantities for local needs. On the whole, 
Formosa has not been bountiful.
Under Japanese rule from 1895-1945, Taiwan was an 
agricultural colony. The Japanese pursued a vigorous 
exploitation policy with a view to creating an agrarian 
economy to compensate for Japanese industrialization.
Taiwan exported primary products, especially rice and 
sugarcane, and imported manufactured goods, that is, about 
90 percent of the exports went to Japan and almost as large 
a proportion of the imports came from there.
The other most important trading partner was mainland 
China, although it accounted for but a modest proportion of 
trade. The per capita value of Taiwan's external trade was 
39 times that of mainland China and one and one-half times 
that of J a p a n . 12 when the Republic of China took over the
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island, Taiwan's economic well-being was significantly
dependent on the export of agricultural products.
After World War II Taiwan was restored to the
Republic of China. As a result of the war, her trade had
declined considerably. When mainland China fell to the
Chinese Communists in 1949, Taiwan's economic relations
with the mainland were severed along with a trading
relationship. The small island faced an urgent necessity to
shift its export market to other parts of the world.
Maurice Scott stated Taiwan's economic situation in his
article, "Foreign Trade :"
Deprived of protected markets in Japan and China for 
its exports, the economy of Taiwan was left to 
reestablish itself as an independent economy for the 
first time in its h i s t o r y . 13
The Taiwan government expanded agricultural products 
for export, reduced imports, and coordinated industrial 
development. It concentrated on establishing and expanding 
industries to supply the domestic market, expecially the 
production of fertilizer to increase agricultural output.
By the end of the 1950s, when Taiwan began its export 
orientation, world trade and the world economy were 
embarking on a long period of constant expansion. The world 
climate and Taiwan's timing were right 11^
Under colonial rule the Japanese gave the Taiwanese 
little opportunity to enter secondary and higher education.
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Neither were the Taiwanese permitted to occupy any senior 
governmental or managerial positions. In 1949 a large 
number of industrialists, businessmen, engineers, 
scientists, and administrators migrated to Taiwan when the 
Nationalists withdrew from mainland China. Most of them 
were highly educated and trained.
These mainlanders became the elite of society and made 
significant contributions to economic development in Taiwan 
the past 37 years. They filled the technical personnel and 
skilled supervisory vacancies caused by the departure of the 
Japanese in 1945, and were responsible for government aid 
as well as economic and trading policies that followed. As 
a result, Taiwan's foreign trade conditions gradually 
stabilized.
When, in 1949, approximately one million Chinese 
migrated from the mainland to Taiwan, the population was 
estimated to be over six million,15 in the years that 
followed, the population increased rapidly under Nationalist 
rule. By 1983 the population reached 18.7 million, a 1.49 
percent growth rate, with a density of 520 per square 
kilometer.17 This population density was one of the 
highest in the world with 64.5% between the ages of 15 to 
64. This represented a tremendous and vigorous work 
force.15
10
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In addition, because the government concentrated on 
educational reform throughout the years, especially in 
technical and vocational colleges, Taiwan has a 
high-quality as well as abundant human resource to cope with 
the demands of technology and international trade. The 
natural resources are limited, but the Chinese in Taiwan 
view their human resource as inexhaustible.
External Factors
Corruption within the monetary system and failure to 
carry out land reform were major factors in the civil war 
which resulted in the Nationalists leaving the mainland. 
Although they pulled out in 1949, the civil war between them 
and the Chinese Communists never officially has ended. Even 
now the leaders of mainland China continually advocate the 
liberation of Taiwan and unification of China.
After retreating to Taiwan, the Nationalists were eager 
to establish a sound economic system and implement a series 
of agricultural developments which consolidated the future 
capabilities of foreign trade development. No persuasion 
was needed to enlist everyone in a campaign to rebuild and 
develop Taiwan's economy.^^ In the early 1950s the 
government and the people perceived intuitively that Taiwan 
was their last opportunity, their last place to survive.
They had to do their best to maintain the small island— or 
be buried by the Chinese Communists. In the 1960s the
11
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ability of leadership to sustain the morale of the people in 
Taiwan and expand international trade rapidly lay, in part, 
upon the diplomatic support of its principal trading 
partners, the United States and Japan, and upon the 
country's worldwide diplomatic relations.
As the Chinese Communists, through control of China 
mainland, won international recognition and became regarded 
as the sole legitimate government of China, Taiwan faced 
increasing difficulties in the diplomatic world. Taiwan 
maintained diplomatic relations with many countries and 
membership in important international organizations until 
the beginning of the 1970s, but acceptance of the Chinese 
Communists as a member of the United Nations in 1971 
precipitated a major change. Taiwan withdrew from the 
United Nations and lost diplomatic recognition; at the same 
time, the Communist government in Beijing gained 
recognition.
In the wake of Taiwan's expulsion from the United 
Nations, Japan, Taiwan's most important partner in Asia, 
switched its recognition to Beijing in 1972, as did 25 other 
countries between 1971 and 1972. By 1977, 111 countries had 
established relations with Beijing. Only 23 countries 
maintained relations with T a i p a i . 2 0
A further difficulty arose when the United States 
established diplomatic relations with mainland China, 
announced by President Carter in December 1978. Taiwan
12
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responded by breaking off official relations with Washington 
and terminating the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty.21 The 
period of shock which followed caused a drop in the stock 
market. Unease about the future was experienced by the 
public. Taiwan felt that its security was seriously 
threatened.
The U.S. Congress passed and President Carter signed 
the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979. This Act established a 
new relationship with the United States, defined as 
unofficial, and provided for many-faceted and ongoing 
economic, cultural, and technological relations with Taiwan. 
The Taiwanese government subsequently expanded its overseas 
lobbying efforts, encouraging other countries not 
recognizing Taiwan to adopt the American formula.22
Taiwan made further efforts to expand and strengthen 
international trade by setting up semiofficial "substantial 
diplomacies." The economic growth and foreign trade 
expansion enhanced Taiwan's stability and position in the 
international business community, and helped compensate for 
the series of diplomatic setbacks experienced in recent 
years. The government proved that it was capable of 
adjusting to pressure and effectively leading its 
businessmen into exploiting new markets via different
channels. 23
No matter what develops between Taiwan and mainland 
China in the future, the latter might take advantage of
13
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Taiwan's gradually deteriorating diplomatic position to 
initiate different kinds of pressure on Taiwan's foreign 
trade. The effectiveness of pressure heavily depends on the 
reaction of Taiwan's trading partners, such as the United 
States and Japan, to mainland China's attempt to interfere 
in trade with Taiwan. Taiwan's economic achievement and 
trading development must be elevated continuously through 
its "substantial diplomacy" to make the trading partners 
realize that Taiwan's free enterprise system, relatively 
open society, and deep involvement in foreign trade play an 
active role and make a significant contribution in 
international affairs.
Economic Achievements of International Trade
Any island economy, by the very nature of its 
geographic arrangement, must rely on trade to survive.
Taiwan is no exception to this rule. Wou Wei pointed out in 
his article, "New Trends in the Republic of China's External 
Economy Policy," that the course of Taiwan's economic 
development, like the island economies of Japan and England 
which used foreign trade as transitional measures to foster 
their domestic economic strengths, and gradually became less 
dependent upon foreign trade, has been heavily dependent upon 
foreign trade to support its agricultural and industrial 
developments. Taiwan is unlike the small island city- 
states (island-urban types) of Singapore and Hong Kong,
14
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with economic development concentrated in industry in 
accordance with their urban d e v e l o p m e n t s . 24
Today, because Taiwan's geographical sea-surrounded 
environment is limited, the island has become more dependent 
on foreign trade to establish substantial economic ties with 
other countries, hoping thereby to stimulate the economy. 
Under the circumstances, Taiwan took on a high-growth rate 
and export-oriented strategy of economic development in 
order to generate rapid growth in foreign trade.
From 1952 to 1985, exports grew in value from $0.1 
billion to $30.7 billion, and imports from $0.2 billion to 
$20.1 b i l l i o n . 25 The trade balance has shown a greater 
surplus every year since 1976 (with the exception of 1975, 
the oil crisis year). In 1985 the amount of trade surplus 
amounted to $10.6 billion. (See Table 1.)
During the last few years, 1975-1984, Taiwan has been 
ranked second, after Singapore, in economic growth in the 
w o r l d . 26 By 1985 Taiwan was ranked, via data released by 
the International Monetary Fund, as the tenth largest 
exporting nation in the world, well ahead of other 
developing countries. For imports, Taiwan ranked 
nineteenth. Combining imports and exports, Taiwan was the 
fifteenth largest trading nation in the world. On the 
whole, Taiwan's foreign trade constituted 84.6% of its 
GNP in 1985.27 This reflects Taiwan's high degree of 
economic dependence on foreign trade.
15
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T a b le  1
Foreign Trade Volume
Year
Total
trade
Index'*’ 
(1975 = 100)
Surplus (+) 
or deficit (-)
Proportion of total 
trade to GNP 
GNP Proportion
1975 11,260.5 100 (-) 642.9 15,293 73.6
1976 15,765.2 140 (+) 567.4 18,318 86.1
1977 17,871.6 159 (+) 849.8 21,364 83.7
1978 23,714.0 211 (+) 1,660.2 26,196 90.5
1979 30,877.1 274 (+) 1,329.7 32,346 95.5
1980 39,543.7 351 (+) 77.5 40,022 98.8
1981 43,810.7 389 (+) 1,411.6 45,920 95.4
1982 41,092.5 365 (+) 3,315.9 46,500 88.4
1983 45,409.7 403 (+) 4,835.7 49,754 91.3
1984 52,415.5 465 (+) 8,497.3 56,638 92.5
1985 50,823.4 451 (+) 10,610.2 60,078 84.6
*Unit: U.S. $ mill ion.
^Percent growth since 1975.
Source:
R.O.C., Foreign Trade Development of the Republic of China, 1985 (Taipei: 
of Economic Affairs, Board of Foreign Trade, 1986), Table 2, p. 13.
Mi ni stry
16
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The rapid expansion of Taiwan's foreign trade is guided 
by a series of economic plans which establish goals and 
provide incentives and stimuli for the private sector 
through several approaches. The primary features of these 
approaches may be recapitulated as follows : (1) land
reform, (2) U.S. economic aid, and (3) export processing 
zones.
Land Reform
The early land reform was carried out in three stages. 
In 1949 farm rents were reduced from a prevailing level of 
50 percent or more to 37.5 percent of the annual yield of 
the principal crop. In 1951 lands owned by the government 
were sold to tenant farmers. The third stage, begun in 1953 
with passage of the Land-to-the-TiHer Act, was completed 
in less than two years. This program limited the holdings 
of landlords to seven acres of rice land and transferred the 
excess land to those farming it. The tenants paid for the 
land in 10 annual installments while the landlords received 
full compensation in the form of crop bonds and stocks in 
four government corporations.28
Briefly, land reform may be viewed as a recognition of 
the agricultural system which, directly, provided former 
tenants an incentive to put more efforts and resources into 
increasing agricultural output. Indirectly it improved 
cultivation methods, especially with multiple cropping
17
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and irrigation. Although agricultural products still 
have to be imported in considerable quantities— the labor 
force has tended to move agriculture into the industrial 
sector— land reform provided a sound basis for export 
success in agricultural products such as sugar, bananas, and 
mushrooms in the early period, and consolidated the future 
foundation for industrialization.^9
U.S. Economic Aid
In the early 1950s Taiwan was in a critical financial 
and economic position. The basic necessities of living were 
in short supply. The widespread budget deficit and price 
inflation could have undermined the political stability and 
economical viability of Taiwan. U.S. aid primarily 
nurtured public confidence in the success of the Taiwanese 
government's programs.30
U.S. aid contributed to the economic transformation of 
Taiwan three ways: (1) influencing the formation of
governmental economic policies, (2) investing directly in 
development, and (3) providing goods that released Taiwan's 
funds for investment. By these approaches, aid-financed 
imports accounted for 30 percent of domestic investment in 
Taiwan throughout the U.S. economic aid program. In the 
meantime, exports expanded.31
18
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The most important consequence of U.S. aid was the 
boosting of private enterprise by creating a climate for 
private investment and promoting greater reliance on market 
forces. U.S. economic aid had been terminated in 1965, but 
Taiwan was stimulated to take further steps to improve the 
climate for private investment and promote exports for 
economic takeoff. Exports to obtain investments and credits 
from foreign sources also were increased.^2
Export Processing Zones
After the termination of U.S. economic aid, the 
government in Taiwan adopted a series of approaches for 
directly reinforcing the establishment and expansion of 
export industries and enacted a program for the 
encouragement of foreign investment. Three Export 
Processing Zones (EPZs) were established in Kaohsiung, 
Tarthung, and Nantze.
An EPZ, a combination industrial district and free 
trade zone, is designed so investors can import basic 
materials, process them, and export finished products. 
Foreign investors setting up factories within an EPZ 
receive considerable advantages and enjoy special 
incentives. These include low-cost skilled labor, exemption 
from customs duties on the importation of raw materials, 
machinery, parts, and exported products, tax holidays, and 
developed support facilities. All make zonal operations 
attractive.2 4
19
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EPZs have contributed to Taiwan three ways:
1. Via attracting foreign capital, about 75 percent of 
the total earnings of the three EPZs were used to pay for 
local costs, thereby leaving a substantial amount of foreign 
exchange in Taiwan.
2. Via technology transfer, EPZs accelerated the 
development of Taiwan's industry. That is, a number of 
satellite industries gradually developed to supply the needs 
of EPZs and directly influenced the island's economy.
3. Via the rapid expansion of labor-intensive exports, 
EPZs have become an important source of industrial 
employment and have reduced the initial labor surplus.^^
Briefly, the contribution of EPZs to Taiwan is 
accelerating in export expansions and it has multifold 
significance. Throughout the past 37 years, land reform and 
U.S. economic aid has increased agricultural output and 
farmers' living standards, and induced local entrepreneurs 
to become investors in Taiwan's industrial and economic 
development. Stimulated by a cutoff of U.S. aid, the 
establishment of EPZs helped Taiwan develop an export- 
oriented economy and served as a conveyor of up-to-date 
technology. These approaches have successfully shifted 
Taiwan from an undeveloped to a developing country. Based 
on the smooth implementation of these approaches, Taiwan's 
foreign trade has grown dramatically and been praised as a 
successful model for other developing countries.
20
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Chapter 3
CURRENT BOTTLENECKS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
Taiwan’s foreign trade with its export-oriented policy 
has, in past years, generated much profit and placed the 
country in a favorable situation. On the other hand, a 
limited domestic market has created greater dependence on 
foreign trade and concentration in export markets in the 
United States and Japan. Taiwan thus faces a number of 
problems. These involve trade surplus with the United 
States, imports that are heavily dependent upon Japan, 
commercial counterfeiting problems, and massive foreign 
exchange reserves.
At the same time, the global economy has become more 
interdependent. That is, any country's policies, economic 
or political, may seriously affect other countries' economic 
development. Developed countries do their utmost to sustain 
superiority in their industrial output while most developing 
countries attempt to promote their industrialization. 
Accordingly, both developed and developing countries try to 
stimulate exports but, contrarily, block imports. Taiwan, 
faced with this sophisticated situation, is in a dilemma.
How to solve these problems and break through trading 
bottlenecks have become important issues.
21
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Trade Surplus with the United States
Taiwan maintains economic and cultural ties with the 
United States although she has received no economic aid 
from the United States since the mid-1960s. The break in 
formal diplomatic relations between Taiwan and the United 
States occurred at the end of 1978; nonetheless, Taiwan's 
bilateral trade with the United States has continued to 
exist and has grown r a p i d l y .
Taiwan is heavily dependent on overseas supplies of raw 
materials and export markets because of her limited natural 
resources and export-oriented strategy. The United States 
has dominated this trade, particularly in regard to Taiwan's 
export markets. This has led to a trade surplus in 
Taiwan's favor since 1967.^^ During the last 10 years, 
1975-1986, Taiwan's exports to the United States increased 
from U.S. $1.8 billion to U.S. $14.9 billion, and imports 
from the United States increased from U.S. $1.7 billion to 
U.S. $5 billion. The average growth rate per year in regard 
to exports to the United States was 20.9%, but imports from 
the United States were only 12.7% (see Table 2).
By 1985 Taiwan's two-way trade with the United States 
soared to U.S. $19.6 billion, accounting for 38.4% of 
Taiwan's total foreign trade, which made Taiwan the sixth 
largest trading partner of the United States. Meanwhile, 
Taiwan's exports to the United States of U.S. $14.8 billion
22
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C/)
C/) Taiwan's Trade with the U.S.A.
Year
Exports Imports Total trade
Surplus (+)Amount
% of 
total 
export Amount
% of 
total 
import Amount
$ of 
total 
trade
1975 1,822.7 34.3 1,652.1 27.8 3,474.8 30.9 (+) 170.6
1976 3,038.7 37.2 1,797.6 23.7 4,836.3 30.7 (+) 1,241.1
1977 3,636.3 38.9 1,963.8 23.1 5,600.1 31.3 (+) 1,672.5
1978 5,010.4 39.5 2,376.1 21.5 7,386.5 31.1 (+) 2,634.3
1979 5,652.3 35.1 3,380.8 22.9 9,033.1 29.3 (+) 2,271.5
1980 6,760.3 34.1 4,673.5 23.7 11,433.8 28.9 (+) 2,086.8
1981 8,163.1 36.1 4,765.7 22.5 12,928.8 29.5 (+) 3,397.4
1982 8,758.9 39.4 4,563.2 24.2 13,322.1 32.4 (+) 4,195.7
1983 11,333.7 45.1 4,646.4 22.9 15,980.1 35.2 (+) 6,687.3
1984 14,867.7 48.8 5,041.6 23.0 19,909.3 38.0 (+) 9,826.1
1985 14,770.3 48.1 4,746.5 23.6 19,516.8 38.4 (+)10,023.8
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1986), Table 13, p. 25.
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and imports from the United States of U.S. $4.8 billion left 
a deficit for the United States of U.S. $10 billion. The 
trade volume made Taiwan the third largest exporter to the 
United States, following Japan and Canada, in 1985.
Although the United States is Taiwan's largest trading 
partner, Taiwan's continual escalating trade surplus with 
the United States has become a serious bilateral trade 
problem to the United States. Additionally, the perennial 
U.S. trade deficit, which has worsened in recent years, has 
increased public opinion against foreign trade in American 
business communities. The subject also is heatedly 
discussed in the U.S. Congress.
To right this imbalance, some urge restricting imports 
while others suggest expanding American exports. More than 
300 protectionist bills have been proposed, one after 
another, in the U.S. Congress. The Jenkins and Thurmond 
Amendment Bills are the most important and t y p i c a l . 39 Thus 
far these two bills have been vetoed repeatedly by President 
Reagan in light of abiding by free trade, but it is expected 
that protectionist pressure will resurge in the U.S.
Congress from time to time. In face of the pressure of 
mounting protectionism in the United States, Taiwan's 
chronic trade surplus with the United States has become 
unendurable to the United States. Taiwan's future bilateral 
trade with the United States will, without a doubt, 
experience many more challenges and tests.
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The trade imbalance between Taiwan and the United 
States exists for several reasons. The major one is that 
Taiwan produces low-cost and increasingly high-quality 
consumer goods that are very competitive in the American 
market. The United States consequently imports large 
volumes of textiles, footwear, and electronic products from 
Taiwan every year. This is more economical than 
manufacturing them at home, the imported goods are 
reasonably priced, and their quality is attractive. In 
return, Taiwan's imports from the United States are 
primarily agricultural products (e.g., wheat, soybeans, and 
cotton), chemicals, and machinery.40 on the whole, American 
manufacturers' attempts to dominate Taiwan's market with 
industrial products is difficult because of consumer 
preferences, Japanese competition, and tariff barriers.
Taiwan's cheap, skilled labor permits the country's 
attractive-quality merchandise to enter the United States 
market at a low cost. Indeed, the labor force is one of 
Taiwan's most valuable assets. The youthfulness of the 
labor force and Taiwan's high standard of education increase 
labor's adaptability and speed of learning, and keep 
manufacturing costs low. For instance, the expansion of 
exports is concentrated on particular industries (textiles, 
clothing, canned foodstuffs, and electronic products) in 
which techniques, in part transferred from developed 
countries, become familiar to technicians and workers.
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Accordingly, manufacturing cost, especially in the costs of 
learning, could be decreased.
Furthermore, average wages in Taiwan are lower than 
in the United States. In 1985 the average monthly earnings 
of manufacturing employees in Taiwan was around U.S. $340. 
Even though wage rates are moving up with inflation, unit 
costs still are below the United States level. Aside from 
low wages, Taiwan's laborers work long hours in comparison 
with United States laborers. In 1985, for example, the 
average monthly working hours of manufacturing employees in 
Taiwan was 206 hours.^3
Taiwan's high quality labor force, low wage rates, and 
longer working hours give the country a competitive 
advantage in labor-intensive products and encourage it to 
specialize in the production and exportation of these goods. 
United States investors would like to shift their production 
processes from the United States to Taiwan in terms of 
Taiwan's higher productivity, then repatriate the cheaper 
products in order to earn substantial profits in the U.S. 
market.
In 1976 the United States initiated a 10-year 
Generalized System of Preferences {GSP) under which duty 
exception privileges are offered to developing countries. 
Taiwan is one of the beneficiaries. Because Taiwan's light 
industrial products and processed agricultural products are 
entitled to these privileges, they have become very
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competitive in the American market. This has led to 
sustained rapid growth in Taiwan's exports to the United 
States and a trade surplus in Taiwan's favor.
Taiwan has held 27% of the share of GSP imports to 
the United States (more than any other country in the 
world), but the United States has not acquired the same 
treatment from Taiwan. In view of the imbalanced trade 
between Taiwan and the United States, the U.S. Congress is 
attempting to curtail the share allocated to Taiwan. If 
this comes about, it will be a terrible blow to Taiwan’s 
critical trade relationship with the United States.^5
Because Taiwan takes on limited import liberalization, 
in order to protect developing domestic industries, American 
exports face considerable tariff and nontariff barriers in 
the Taiwan market. The trade surplus is, therefore, due 
partly to the high tariff structure and nontariff 
barriers.46
Taiwan's customs duties, viewed as financial revenues 
for the government in past years, remain at a high level in 
general. For example, a number of imports, such as consumer 
goods and luxury items, have tariffs as high as 100%; 
machinery, word processors, and home and kitchen articles 
also have excessive t a r i f f s . 4 7  Meanwhile, tariffs have been 
levied on a GIF (cost, insurance, and freight) rather than 
an FOB (free on board) pricing basis, giving American 
exporters an adverse position. That is to say, the
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Japanese— America's strongest competitor in the Taiwan 
domestic market— have enjoyed much lower freight charges 
because of their proximity to Taiwan. Therefore, an item 
which costs exactly the same at the factory gate in the 
United States and Japan will carry a higher duty if it comes 
from the United States.48
Taiwan's economic development is somewhat affected 
by the Japanese. The Japanese have successfully maintained 
a protected market against foreign producers by using 
nontariff barriers. Taiwan has tried to duplicate some 
of the approaches to protect its domestic industries.49 
As a result, nontariff barriers have built up, one after 
another, against imports of a number of goods and services. 
These various import bans are implemented by administrative 
order or by denying import permits. In this sense, American 
exports often are subject to bans or severe limitations. 
Under nontariff barriers foreign businessmen are allowed 
a limited scope in insurance, accounting, shipping, and 
other services. Thus American firms face difficulties 
selling services to Taiwan.
Heavy competition from Japan is another major obstacle 
to expanding U.S. imports to Taiwan. Via its proximity to 
Taiwan, Japan has more trading advantages in the Taiwan 
market than does the United States. In addition to lower 
shipping charges, Japanese vendors have advantages such as
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shorter delivery time and quicker backup on parts and 
services.
The time difference between Taipei and Tokyo is an hour; 
it takes but two hours by plane from Tokyo to Taipei. The 
cost of transporting a salesman to Taipei from Japan is 
cheaper, perhaps by half, than from the United States. When 
considering time and cost, Japan can provide more proximate 
and convenient after-sales service to Taiwan than can the 
United States.51
Reversing the long-term imbalances on trade, which have 
been a matter of serious concern between Taiwan and the 
United States, cannot be done overnight. But 
progress— bilateral trade negotiations— should be made.
With the continuing efforts of both countries, the rate of 
improvement should accelerate.
Taiwan should try to decrease dependence on the United 
States, which would make Taiwan's foreign trade less 
vulnerable to fluctuations in the American economy. It is 
expected that some of Taiwan's exports will be restricted in 
the near future by protectionism in the United States 
because legislators supported by economic interest groups 
have increased pressure on the Reagan administration.
Taiwan does not, therefore, need to concentrate trade 
exclusively on the U.S. market. It ought, rather, to 
diversify its exports to Europe or other regions of the 
world, thereby dispersing its risk on international trade.
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Under the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), 
Taiwan with U.S. $3 billion of its exports gaining duty-free 
entry to the United States in 1984, is ranked the top 
beneficiary among 140 developing countries and 
t e r r i t o r i e s .52 Any country and its products which benefit 
from the GSP will "graduate" one after another from the 
GSP's list sooner or later. Taiwan is no exception.
Taiwan's exports cannot heavily depend on the GSP and 
hope to enjoy long-running duty-free advantages, and Taiwan 
must, therefore, quicken her pace to graduate from the GSP's 
list as soon as possible. In other words, if Taiwan expends 
efforts to revamp her industrial structure and promote her 
industry from labor-intensive to technology-intensive 
products with low cost and high quality, it will have more 
comparative advantages in the American market even without 
GSP's protection.
Taiwan's current tariffs average a high 7.8%— which 
often are criticized by American e x p o r t e r s . 53 what is more 
incredible is that Taiwan levies a 60% protective tariff on 
imports of textiles and footwear when she has dominated most 
market shares in the United States for many years. Also, 
there is a 50% tariff on imported umbrellas— and Taiwan is 
the world's largest p r o d u c e r . 54 in truth, these industries 
(textiles, footwear, and umbrellas) ought to be able to 
stand by themselves without continual protection.
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Today Taiwan, with tremendous foreign exchange reserves, 
can afford to open her markets further. If Taiwan intends 
to stimulate domestic markets, she must lower unreasonable 
import duties. This would also reduce the trade imbalance 
with the United States, lower consumer prices, increase 
domestic consumption, and help stimulate production and the 
economy as a whole.
Nontariff barriers might be needed to protect domestic 
infant industries. On the other hand, some industries in 
Taiwan, automobiles, for example, have been protected for 
many years by various kinds of import bans and still cannot 
stand on their own. This kind of nontariff barrier should 
be discontinued because industries under long-term 
protection become weak and dependent upon it. Import 
liberalization, in place of nontariff barriers, would help 
develop and stimulate weak industries via American 
technology and capital goods purchased. It also could 
narrow the growing trade gap with the United States.
Taiwan's markets are small, but their potential 
buying power is good. Taiwan has not, however, been able 
to develop in some fields of high technology and she needs 
to acquire this know-how from developed countries. The 
United States must take advantage of this opportunity to 
catch the market share of Taiwan's imports. In view of the 
heavy competition from Japan, though, American vendors should 
emphasize after-sales service— as do the Japanese in Taiwan.
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To meet this problem, American vendors must employ 
local agents or distributors in Taiwan, and stock parts and 
service equipment. Building and maintaining good 
reputations means that U.S. companies must send technicians 
to Taiwan regularly to ensure that the parts are stocked, 
technical skills are kept up, and customers' needs are 
s a t i s f i e d . 5 5  Through these approaches the United States 
would improve its market position in Taiwan.
Of course, Taiwan cannot declare a preference for free 
trade and import liberalization one day, then wipe away all 
tariff or nontariff barriers the next; but, unfair trade 
deserves correction. On the other hand, Taiwan's natural 
resources are limited; it is necessary to import raw 
materials for her industry and manufacturing. If other 
countries slam their doors and close their markets for 
protectionism, Taiwan cannot survive. Free trade and import 
liberalization are Taiwan's only options for balancing the 
trade surplus with the United States, the country's future 
development in international trade, and the island's economy 
as a whole.56
Imports Depend Heavily Upon Japan
After World War II Japan benefited greatly from the 
tolerant and kind treatment of the Chinese and their 
government, and gained much via trade with and 
investments in Taiwan the past three decades.
Similarly, the Republic of China benefited from
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contacts with Japan. These included the experience of 
Japanese economic development, the introduction of 
technology from Japan, and the diffusion of managementskills.57
Thus, in terms of geographic propinquity, historical 
background, business practices, and approximation 
of levels of technological development, Taiwan and Japan 
have maintained a close relationship with one another.
Despite the break in diplomatic relations in 1972, 
two-way trade between Taiwan and Japan scarcely was 
affected. Ironically, Taiwan's bilateral trade with Japan 
is the inverse of that with the United States (see Table 
3). That is, as Taiwan's largest supplier, Japan has 
enjoyed a consistent surplus in bilateral trade since 
1946.58 Although the bilateral trade conditions with Japan 
have been unfavorable, Taiwan's trade deficit has 
increased— as well as her economic development and export 
boost.
In the past 10 years, 1975-1984, Taiwan's imports from 
Japan increased from U.S. $1,812 million to U.S. $6,442 
million, and exports to Japan increased from U.S. $694 
million to U.S. $3,187 million. In other words, Taiwan's 
trade deficit with Japan soared from U.S. $1.118 million to 
$3,255 million. In 1985 Taiwan's two-way trade with Japan 
totaled U.S. $9,014 million: exports to Japan were U.S.
$3,460 million and imports from Japan were U.S. $5,554
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Exports Imports Total trade
Deficit (-)Amount
% of 
total 
export Amount
% of 
total 
import Amount
$ of 
total 
trade
1975 694.2 13.1 1,812.2 30.4 2,506.4 22.3 (-) 1,118.0
1976 1,094.7 13.4 2,451.5 32.3 3,546.2 22.5 {-) 1,356.8
1977 1,120.1 12.0 2,643.0 31.1 3,763.1 21.1 (-) 1,522.9
1978 1,570.3 12.4 3,678.1 33.4 5,248.4 22.1 (-) 2,107.8
1979 2,248.6 14.0 4,561.4 30.9 6,810.0 22.1 (-) 2,312.8
1980 2,173.4 11.0 5,353.2 27.1 7,526.6 19.0 (-) 3,179.8
1981 2,478.7 11.0 5,928.6 28.0 8,407.3 19.2 (-) 3,449.9
1982 2,377.8 10.7 4,780.2 25.3 7,158.0 17.4 (-) 2,402.4
1983 2,477.1 9.9 5,586.7 27.5 8,063.8 17.8 (-} 3,109.6
1984 3,186.5 10.5 6,441.8 29.3 9,628.3 18.4 (-) 3,255.3
1985 3,459.9 11.3 5,554.4 27.6 9,014.3 17.7 (-) 2,094.5
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million. That left an imbalance in Japan's favor of 
U.S. $2,094 million— less than the trade deficit of 
U.S. $3,255 million that occurred in 1984.
Taiwan's trade deficit with Japan was reduced 35.9% 
in 1985 because a series of promotional activities 
produced adverse effects. On the whole, in 1985 Taiwan's 
two-way trade with Japan accounted for 17.7% of Taiwan's 
total foreign trade, next to the United States. Japan 
accounted for 11.3% of Taiwan's exports, and 27.6% of the 
imports (see Table 3), which made Japan the largest exporter
to Taiwan.59
Taiwan's trade deficit with Japan has existed many 
years. Taiwan has attempted to adjust her trade relations 
with Japan, but it has been difficult to substantially 
narrow the gap. The perennial trade deficit with Japan can 
be attributed to five factors.
First, Taiwan was ruled by the Japanese for about 50 
years. Some entrepreneurs, especially those in the senior 
generation educated under Japanese colonial administration, 
share a cultural bond with the Japanese. This colonial 
heritage tends to make Taiwan businessmen prefer to 
cooperate with the Japanese rather than with Americans. In 
addition a subjective, obstinate ideology has grown among 
industrialists and consumers that Japanese products are 
superior in quality to American ones. Consequently Japanese 
goods, such as machinery, capital equipment, or consumer
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goods, are exported to Taiwan in whopping quantities 
every year to meet the needs of industrialists and 
consumers.6 0 This is another basic reason why Japan 
dominates the largest share of Taiwan’s import market.
Second, because Japan has a restrictive policy toward 
the importation of manufactured products, most of Taiwan’s 
exports to Japan are low-valued agricultural commodities and 
processed products such as bananas, canned food, textiles, 
and manufactured metals. Taiwan's demand for Japanese 
imports are costly capital goods and raw materials such as 
machinery and tools, transportation equipment, and iron and 
steel, which Taiwan needs for her industrial development. 
Obviously, the difference in the import/export structure 
between Taiwan and Japan generates an imbalance in Japan’s 
f a v o r . T h i s  unfavorable situation, which has existed for 
decades, contributes to the enormous trade gap between the 
two countries.
Third, Taiwan's economy is heavily dependent on foreign 
technology to support her economic development. Taiwan 
wants to upgrade her technology and attain greater 
self-reliance through imported technical skills. Japan has 
been the preferred technological source because of the 
geographical proximity between Taiwan and Japan, and the 
relative ease with which Chinese and Japanese work 
t o g e t h e r . ^2 From 1952 through 1984 Japan has accounted for
36
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
65% of the technical cooperative ventures in Taiwan compared 
to the 22% of the United S t a t e s .
Japanese firms accept cooperative agreements in order 
to sell their parts and raw materials to local manufacturers 
in Taiwan. The Taiwanese firms then assemble the parts into 
finished goods. The cooperative agreements provide the 
Japanese companies with extensive control of the production 
processes in their host country firms. The Japanese don't, 
however, provide the Taiwanese with the sought-for 
technology. The cooperatives have not produced the greater 
technological independence that Taiwan desires. But they 
have promoted trade; Taiwan has become a profitable parts 
and raw materials market for Japan.^4
Fourth, Japan handles the major portion of Taiwan's 
import market because she is in an ideal position to 
attract Taiwan businessmen and consumers to purchase 
Japanese goods. That is, as previously noted, Japanese 
vendors promote their products via excellent distribution 
networks and after-sales service organizations in Taiwan. 
Also, Japanese vendors are attempting to enter the domestic 
financial market with low interest rates. For example, 
Japanese computer manufacturers are offering unusually 
long-term leases on their machines; lessees enjoy nominal or 
no lease payments for the first year or two of their leases. 
The Japanese are using these strategies to channel control 
of the market share in Taiwan.^5
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Fifth, as do many developing countries, Japan has 
adopted high tariff rates and nontariff barriers to protect 
her domestic market. Taiwan's exports to Japan often are 
subject to restrictions and strict examinations. Vegetables 
and fish particularly are restricted by high tariff rates; 
machines and automobile parts are prohibited for quality 
and security r e a s o n s . B e c a u s e  Taiwan businessmen seldom 
hold product promotion activities in Japan, they cannot 
precisely understand consumers' tastes and, thus, cannot 
enter the Japanese market.
In face of the perennial trade deficit with Japan, Jack 
F. Williams pointed out the basic approach to solve the 
problem:
This trade imbalance with Japan is unlikely to be 
solved until Taiwan's economy is developed to a level 
high enough that it no longer needs the technology and 
high-quality consumer goods of Japan but can produce 
them on the island itself.^7
Taiwan must, therefore, seek advancement in technology, 
improve her industrial structure, and upgrade the quality of 
her products so that she may export more to and rely less on 
Japan for imports. Furthermore, Taiwan has to strengthen 
her base for foreign trade and intensify technical 
coordination with North American and European countries so 
as to improve her overall marketing functions.
Adjusting Taiwan's trade relations with Japan requires 
expanding Taiwan's exports to Japan. Before doing this, the 
government and business community should send a survey team
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to Japan to acquire a better understanding of the 
fundamental characteristics of the Japanese market and 
consumers' preferences. Too, the government should 
strengthen the organization of business communities by 
helping Taiwan traders exhibit their products in Japan and 
explore the possibility of future sales outlets.
Although the trade imbalance with Japan cannot be 
solved within a short time, Taiwan must continue her efforts 
and take advantage of the recent policy of the Japanese 
government to gradually open the market to augment Japanese 
market shares. The value of Japanese yen has risen 
steadily. This should make it advantageous for Taiwan to 
increase exports to Japan.^8
Commercial Counterfeiting Problem
An internationally famous cosmetic manufacturer 
had to go to Taiwan personally to halt a "Mom and Pop" 
operation that was not only counterfeiting his product 
locally but selling it on the international market. He 
found the product excellently copied, so good in fact, 
that he ended up starting to buy the glass containers 
which had been copied after his original and 
manufactured in Taiwan.
The protection of property rights, including patent 
copyrights and trademarks, has created problems in Taiwan. 
Local manufacturers can produce cheap and nice counterfeits 
of Rolex watches, Gucci handbags. Vaseline hair tonic, and 
other hot-selling consumer products. For example, an 
imitation $1,450 Cartier Santos watch sells for $23 in
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Taiwan. Before last year, copies of the IBM personal 
computer appeared under the names Pineapple and Orange.
These models have been denied importation by U.S. Customs 
and Taiwan has been accused of violating copyrights and 
patents.70
The counterfeiting problem has become a worldwide 
phenomenon. It exists in many developing countries, 
including Singapore, Hong Kong, Korea, Thailand, mainland 
China, Mexico, Colombia, and others trying to take a 
shortcut to economic s u c c e s s . 71 Over the past several 
years many developed countries, especially the United 
States, have experienced a rising tide of counterfeit 
products from developing countries. They have 
counterattacked by adopting legal actions and media 
campaigns, and exerting economic and political pressures 
upon the developing countries.
The government in Taiwan recognizes the seriousness of 
counterfeiting problems and has tried to crack down on them. 
Still, in 1982 Taiwan was identified as the world's major 
source of counterfeit goods by the International 
Anticounterfeiting Coalition.72 1985 Taiwan passed
amendments to her trademark and copyright laws. Under the 
new laws the penalties for counterfeiting trademarks 
registered in Taiwan, or reproducing the intellectual work of 
another without authorization, are raised to a maximum of 
5- and 3-year imprisonments, respectively.73 Nonetheless,
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counterfeiters generally receive light sentences which do 
not serve as strong deterrents to violators. For example, 
from January to July 1985, 353 persons were adjudicated 
guilty in counterfeiting cases, but only four were sentenced 
to one to two years imprisonment— a mere 1.1% of the total 
cases (see Table 4).
Table 4
Statistics of Judicial Judgment in Counterfeiting 
Cases from January to July 1985
Type of case
No. of persons punished
Total
2-6
months
6-12
months
1-2
years Detention Fine
Trademark infringement 297 163 48 4 5 77
Patent infringement 29 20 3 0 2 4
Copyright infringement 27 18 7 0 0 _2
Totals 353 201 58 4 7 83
Source:
R.O.C., Latest Developments in Actions Taken for Protection of Intellectual Property 
Rights in the Republic of China for the Period January-July, 1985 (Taipei: Ministry of
Economic Affairs, Board of Foreign Trade, 1985), p. 13.
The infringements result in monetary damages to the 
infringed parties, and to the leading astray of entire 
industries and smearing of the nation's image as well. 
Furthermore, counterfeiting has generated negative effects 
on the business and investment climate. Foreign investors
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cite poor patent protection as a primary reason for their 
reluctance to take high technology to T a i w a n . 7 4
The causes of counterfeiting are complicated. A major 
cause of counterfeiting is generated by international firms 
that specifically and persistently engage in the importation 
of counterfeit goods to other countries. They shuttle 
between developing countries with a variety of samples of 
best-selling commodities, take advantage of low labor 
costs in those countries, and produce large quantities of 
counterfeit goods. Then the goods are shipped around the 
world. Sometimes the manufacturers in the developing 
countries are not aware their mass production of the samples 
constitutes counterfeiting. When a country implements 
strong measures against counterfeiting, the international 
firms transfer their activities to another c o u n t r y . 75
The shortsightedness of Taiwan's industrialists is 
another cause of counterfeiting. During the past two 
decades Taiwan has experienced rapid economic development 
and is trying to develop more technology-intensive 
industries. Many local industries have acquired the 
technological capability to manufacture a wide variety of 
products, but they have invested little in research, 
development, or marketing. Because they are lagging behind, 
the industrialists are tempted to use the trademarks, 
research, and developmental efforts of others as a shortcut 
to financial success.
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Some industrialists in Taiwan are not well-educated. 
They fear high technology— and failure. They hesitate 
to design new products, create new brands, establish 
marketing channels, and exploit new foreign markets.
Rather than cooperate with governmental directives to 
invest money in research and development, they pursue 
self-interests via counterfeiting. As long as their 
products are lucrative, their fear is less when they risk 
imitating hot-selling, popular products and inundating the 
international markets at discount prices.76
In practice, these speculators realize that cranking 
out low cost copies cannot continue. At the same time, an 
old Chinese proverb is deeply rooted in their minds: "It is
better to be the head of a chicken than the tail of an ox." 
Each wants to acquire maximum profits for as long as 
possible regardless of the consequences.77
Counterfeiting has disclosed that a serious gap exists 
between manufacturing capacity and marketing, research, and 
development in Taiwan. To overcome this weakness, the 
government should require industrialists to spend a fixed 
percentage of annual sales on research and development.
This would encourage them to design new products and 
generate a greater incentive to develop marketing 
expertise.7 8
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In addition to emphasizing research and development, 
the government should consider the following as other ways 
of combating the counterfeiting problem:
1. Increasing penalties for counterfeiting and 
refusing to commute imprisonments into fines.
2. Forming a professional tribunal on trademarks, 
patents, and copyright matters to facilitate the 
adjudication of counterfeiting cases.
3. Upgrading the status of the Anticounterfeiting 
Committee to strengthen the Committee's role in the 
planning, supervision, and coordination of a nationwide 
campaign against counterfeiting.
4. Stepping up the cultivation of talents in the field 
of commercial design and encouraging creative work in an 
effort to eliminate counterfeiting.
5. Accelerating social education to instill correct 
ideas into the minds of the people re the protection of 
property rights that should not be infringed upon or 
used arbitrarily.79
If these methods were strictly implemented, the 
counterfeiters gradually would vanish. In the meantime, 
the counterfeiting issue has greatly hindered Taiwan from 
launching into a new era of trading development. If Taiwan 
wishes to sustain a good standing in the international 
economic community, and attract foreign investment, 
technology know-how, and international trade, she must make
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every effort to shed her copycat image. Although Taiwan has 
a long way to go before her copyright and trademark 
protection meets standards expected in the developed world, 
she must persuade her industrialists to look beyond their 
immediate quick profits and lift their visions toward 
larger, more lasting gains.
A Burden as a Result of the Massive 
Foreign Exchange Reserves
In its increasing access during the past 30 years 
to the bounty of an affluent society, the Republic of 
China on Taiwan has accumulated massive and 
still-growing foreign exchange reserves. It is now 
awash in an overflow of idle capital. Meanwhile, 
various sectors of the economy, the overall society, 
and especially of industry cannot find the financial 
investment needed to improve their structures and 
technology for future challenges. After their long 
voyage from an island backwater to a status as one of 
the world's better-off national communities, both our 
people and government must face a truly big problem: 
"How to use money?"80
Many developing countries worry about their onerous 
foreign debts, but Taiwan wonders how to digest massive 
foreign exchange reserves. As of January 1986 Taiwan had 
a foreign debt of only U.S. $5 billion, but she has 
accumulated U.S. $26.1 billion in foreign exchange reserves. 
The Central Bank of China holds U.S. $22.5 billion and nine 
commercial "foreign exchange" banks hold approximately 
U.S. $3.6 billion. It is expected that reserves could reach 
U.S. $35 billion at the end of 1986. The size of Taiwan's 
foreign exchange holding is ranked fifth in the world behind
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West Germany, the United States, Japan, and France.81 The 
total account is equal to the combined foreign exchange 
reserves of Canada, South Korea, and the five ASEAN members 
(the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and 
Singapore).82
According to a general standard, a country should have 
foreign currency sufficient to purchase three to six months 
worth of imports. In 1985 Taiwan imported U.S. $20 billion 
worth of goods which required a monthly expenditure of about 
$1.6 billion. With the Central Bank holding U.S. $22.5 
billion, Taiwan's foreign exchange reserves can purchase 
13 months worth of i m p o r t s . 83 it is obvious that the
reserves are in excess of the normal standard and that they
represent idle money.
While the massive accumulation of foreign exchange 
reflects that the consecutive trade surpluses were 
achieved by Taiwan because of her success in export 
expansion, it also creates a serious problem. That is, the 
huge amount of idle foreign exchange reserves was deposited
in local banks or abroad to earn interest; it was not
appropriately invested in upgrading the overall economy, 
the industrial structure, and elevating living standards.
In general, 90% of Taiwan's imports are raw materials 
and machines which are used to support the island's 
industrial development. In recent years Taiwan's economy 
has faced a labor-intensive/technology-intensive transition,
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but some industries have failed to adequately maintain and 
replenish equipment and machines. Additionally, the 
government's economic orientation and alternative paths 
are unclear. Thus a willingness to invest, via public or 
private sector, remains l o w . 84
Taiwan's capital investment in raw materials and 
equipment has declined since 1980. In 1980 the capital for 
public and private industries totaled New Taiwan Dollar 
(NT $) 456 billion, which accounted for 31% of the GNP. By 
1985 the capital for public and private industries was 
almost unchanged at NT $455 billion, but it accounted for 
only 19% of the GNP.8 5
In the wake of the decrease in capital investment, the 
annual imports of raw materials and machines also declined. 
As long as public or private willingness to invest remained 
low, the imports of capital investment would not increase. 
Furthermore, the overabundant foreign exchange reserves of 
trade surplus— exports over imports— would continue to 
increase as well.
On the other hand, the high foreign exchange reserves 
and low capital investment signify that Taiwan has not 
developed an appropriate capital market to transform its 
savings into investment. That is to say, Taiwan's huge 
amount of export earnings flow into short-term foreign 
securities rather than into long-term domestic investments. 
Most of this huge foreign exchange surplus has been used
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to purchase foreign national bonds, mostly U.S., with a 
yearly payoff of about 1 0 %.^6 should the rates of foreign 
exchange fluctuate drastically, the foreign currencies 
deposited in foreign banks would incur a great loss if 
risk were not dispersed.
Under the present successive trade surplus, the 
NT Dollar has been forced to appreciate in order to curb 
increases in the foreign exchange reserves. This situation 
puts the government and industries in a dilemma and is 
forming a latent crisis to Taiwan's future economic 
development four ways:
1. It will discount the value of foreign exchange
reserves whether deposited in local or foreign banks.
2. Due to the appreciation of NT Dollars, Taiwan's
exports will become less competitive— especially during a 
growing economic recession.
3. If economic recession persists, it will result in 
high unemployment and directly impact public living 
standards.
4. If worse comes to worse, Taiwan will lose her 
ability to improve the country's overall economic and social 
structure as well as competitiveness in markets around the 
world.® ̂
The most direct and effective way to resolve the 
massive foreign exchange reserves is to open up Taiwan's 
markets through import expansion. This method would not
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only enable local people to enjoy a higher quality of life 
but allow other countries to participate in foreign exchange 
with Taiwan and stimulate their economic growths also. 
Meanwhile, increasing imports can force domestic industries 
to upgrade their product quality, make their operations more 
efficient, and reach new milestones through competition.88
In case of an overall economic transition, every sector 
of Taiwan--industrial, technological, research and 
development, the basic infrastructure, the environment, and 
education— needs money for further development. Because 
public and private willingness to invest remains low and 
most industrialists don't know how to make appropriate 
investments, the government should draft an investment 
program that would include equipment replenishment, 
productivity promotion, marketing strategies, and efficient 
management to guide hesitant industrialists.^^ As the 
investment climate warmed and assumed shape, the mass of 
frozen idle capital would thaw and find an outlet.
Besides increasing domestic investment, the Taiwan 
government must encourage industrialists to engage in 
overseas investments because the massive foreign exchange 
reserves serve as potential assets. Before, Taiwan's 
foreign exchange was deficient. Capital that flowed out of 
the country was viewed as a kind of capital loss. Thus the 
government restricted the overseas activity of Chinese firms
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in regard to the amount that could be invested and set 
stipulations on the debt/profit ratio.
It's another story today. If Taiwan approaches 
overseas investment, especially in the United States, it 
could acquire four advantages:
1. Digesting the overabundance of idle capital.
2. Offsetting the pressure of foreign protectionism.
3. Having access to foreign markets, management, 
and high technology.
4. Elevating Taiwan's economic and trading status in 
the world.90
Via overseas investment Taiwan can strengthen its 
competence to meet the competitive trading challenge of 
developing countries. The foreign exchange reserves 
resemble a reservoir that can release excessive water and 
let needed water flow in. How to control the floodgate of 
foreign exchange reserves while avoiding inundation or 
insufficiency is the government's obligation.
If Confucius were alive today, he would not say, "Worry 
not about scarcity but uneven distribution; worry not about 
poverty but instability." He would be more likely to say, 
"Worry not about sufficient funds but low investment; worry 
not about wealth but how to use it."
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Chapter 4
FUTURE PROSPECTS 
Strong Competition from South Korea
Like Taiwan in past decades. South Korea has been 
acclaimed one of Asia's Four Dragons due to its soaring 
economic achievement. Although South Korea is facing a 
number of political challenges from North Korea's military 
threat, students' demonstrations, and the political 
pressures of opposing parties, it has not discarded its 
ideal to march toward a country with great economic power. 
Furthermore, South Korea announced that when it hosts the 
Olympic Games in Seoul in 1988, it will do so in the guise 
of a fully advanced country.^1
Taiwan and South Korea have basically identical 
cultural backgrounds that stem from the Confucian 
discipline. Confucian devotion to education molds people 
who are literate and ambitious. As Confucian believers, 
Taiwan and South Korea are progressing rapidly in economic 
development and international trade and are displaying 
remarkable achievements. South Korea acts more intrepid 
than Taiwan and is more ahead in some respects. Today, 
South Korea is a strong competitive rival to Taiwan in 
international trade.
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Taiwan and South Korea took a similar approach, by 
export expansion means, to stimulate their economic 
growths, but South Korea preferred a devaluation policy, 
without regard to inflation, to promote its exports. Unlike 
South Korea, Taiwan stressed price stability with a view to 
avoiding economic unsteadiness and inflation. As a result. 
South Korea's export prices in U.S. dollars have gradually 
become more competitive than Taiwan's prices in recent 
years.^2
In addition. South Korea upgraded industrial exports 
with greater intensity than Taiwan. In other words, the 
South Korean government directly interfered in the country's 
industries in order to acquire dramatic gains in industrial 
growth and export performance.9 3 Consequently, under the 
government's power a number of small companies were forced 
to merge. Several conglomerates were formed such as 
Hyundai, Daewoo, and Samsung.
The government supports these conglomerates by foreign 
debts. These conglomerates also responded to government 
directives to invest in research and development, purchase 
advanced technology from overseas, and establish commercial 
information networks in developed countries. Presently, 
through trial and error. South Korea has built up steel, 
automobile, and shipbuilding industries which can compete 
directly against Japan. Last year South Korean automobiles 
replaced Japanese cars as Canada's No. 1 import. This year
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Hyundai's new car, the Excel, went on sale in the United 
States, and orders were strong.
The government in Taiwan used less pressure and fewer 
inducements to persuade private enterprises to merge and 
form conglomerates than did South Korea which had mammoth 
industrial groups driving the entire economy. Contrarily, 
numerous small companies exist in almost every industry in 
Taiwan because everyone wants to be a company president. 
According to 1983 data, 85% of all factories employed fewer 
than 50 workers and 89% had fixed assets worth less than 
US $250,000.95
In the past years these small companies, which 
primarily were family-oriented, contributed much to 
developing Taiwan's international trade. They also 
revealed weaknesses in changes in the world trade picture 
and South Korea's strong competition. The major weakness 
is that the companies are too small to do their own 
marketing overseas. They have too little capital and 
experience to invest in high technology and elbow aside 
multinational competitors in foreign markets.
Taiwan, with her massive foreign exchange reserves-- 
unlike South Korea which had only U.S. $2.6 billion in 
foreign exchange reserves and a foreign debt that reached 
to $45 billion in 1985— has the capital and capability 
to compete with South Korea.96 in order to meet South 
Korea's strong competition and catch up with her industrial
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exports, Taiwan should merge the out-of-date and family-run 
companies. The government must offer subsidies and tax 
concessions to companies investing in high technology 
industries. Ultimately, for the purpose of overtaking South 
Korea's marketing strategy, Taiwan must set up marketing 
networks and distribution channels in the world to collect 
commercial information and gain a bigger market share in 
foreign countries.
Effects of the Open-door Policy of Mainland China
When Deng Hsiao-ping took over the Communist regime 
in 197 8, mainland China opened her door and engaged in 
economic reform which involved the marketization of 
transactions and privatization of property rights. 
Furthermore, this reform opened foreign capitalist trade, 
loans, and investments. This helped the backward economy 
that resulted from mainland China's self-imposed 20-year 
isolation.^7 whether or not Deng's economic reform 
succeeds or fails, it has at least provided an opportunity 
for Chinese people to become acquainted with the Western 
world and touch the capitalistic society.
Along with her open-door policy, mainland China has 
actively involved herself in foreign trade. More and 
more "Made in China" products are being rushed into 
international markets, especially the American market. Most
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of the mainland China exports to the United States are cheap 
textiles and garments, which are Taiwan's major exports 
also, second to electrical machinery and apparatus. In face 
of the pressure in the American market from the low-wage 
competitor of mainland China, Taiwan would gradually lose 
her advantage in the cloth and clothing trade. What’s more, 
if mainland China persists in her current economic reform, 
it is expected that mainland China will catch up with 
Taiwan's exports in footwear, toys, canned foods, sporting 
goods, and paper products in the future.98
Mainland China launched a series of peaceful overtures 
for establishing "three links" (mail, trade, and 
air/shipping services) with Taiwan as a first step toward 
the ultimate goal of reunification. Taiwan has tenaciously 
insisted on a "three no" policy (no contacts, no 
negotiation, and no compromise) with her old enemy.^^ It's 
interesting that, indirectly, a trading relationship between 
Taiwan and mainland China has been forming since the late 
1970s. This has grown significantly up to the present 
time.10 0
Official Taiwan figures show that total indirect trade 
was U.S. $51,000 in 1977. That figure jumped to U.S. $21 
million in 1979, U.S. $242 million in 1980, and U.S. $390 
million in 1981.101 in 1984, total indirect trade came to 
U.S. $560 million and to U.S. $1.5 billion in 1985 of which 
Taiwan's exports accounted for 77%.1®^ Most of the indirect
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trade passes through Hong Kong, Singapore, or Japan, which 
then is sold to mainland China. The major Taiwan exports to 
mainland China are older-model motorcycles, black-and-white 
TV sets, and machinery; mainland China exports only cotton 
and Chinese medicines to T a i w a n . 103
Direct trade with mainland China is illegal in Taiwan 
now. The Taiwan government does not, however, interfere 
with indirect trade because the "Made in Taiwan" products 
are sold to buyers (middlemen) in Hong Kong or Japan. As 
before stated, Taiwan is deficient in natural resources and 
raw materials which mainland China can supply sufficiently, 
yet Taiwan's highly productive industrial economy can 
manufacture many products such as calculators, electronics, 
appliances, machinery, and so on which currently are much in 
demand in mainland China.
In theory, through indirect trade it appears that there 
will be an economic complementarity between Taiwan and 
mainland China.10 4  t o o , it will give Taiwan a chance to 
enter this big market and demonstrate the superiority of her 
economic system. In reality, with respect to political 
issues, indirect trade is very complicated; it is far from 
being clear and simple.
Taiwan has two concerns: how long mainland China's
open door policy will be in effect and how dependable the 
mainland market is. If, in the indirect foreign trade 
relationship, Taiwan becomes overly dependent upon mainland
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China, Taiwan would have difficulty surviving should the 
relationship suddenly terminate. Indeed, her overall 
economy would be bankrupt. It is hoped that the growing 
trade is the result of natural forces deriving from the 
increased liberalization of economic planning and trade on 
mainland China.105
In general, trade is more or less risky--whether with 
mainland China or other foreign countries. The Taiwan 
government cannot, therefore, adopt a "head in the sand" 
policy to evade the indirect trade issue with mainland 
China. The government ought, instead, to provide her 
manufacturers and traders with information about marketing 
in mainland China, and teach the businessmen how to disperse 
trade risks if they want to penetrate the mainland China 
market through middlemen. By means of indirect trade, 
opening the mainland China door wider should be pleasing 
to the Chinese in both countries.
Governmental and Entrepreneurial Efforts
Now, spurred by intense competition from lesser 
developed areas with cheaper labor, Taiwan's economy is 
undergoing a second transition. The traditional industries 
in Taiwan, such as textiles and the assembly of consumer 
electronic products, served the island well when her economy 
was in the early stages of industrialization and there was a 
huge amount of inexpensive manpower to be employed.
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Today, because of an increasing standard of living, labor 
in Taiwan is not as cheap as before. The labor-intensive 
industries, which gradually have become sunset industries, 
are unable to effectively compete in the international 
market against the cheap labor of Malaysia, Indonesia, Sri 
Lanka, and mainland China.106
Under these circumstances the Taiwan government and her 
industrialists need to understand that there is only one way 
to go. The country's future development in foreign trade is 
dependent upon upgrading industries in the direction of more 
sophisticated capital and technology-intense operations such 
as computers and precision machinery. Success will require 
large amounts of human capital in the form of skilled 
laborers, technicians, engineers, and managers.
The government should expand and improve vocational and 
technical education to cope with the future technical and 
mechanical needs. Also, the industrialists could hire 
executives and managers from developed countries as 
technical advisors and managers in the factories.107 
The government or the industrialists could try to lure 
overseas Chinese employed in high technology companies in 
advanced countries to return home, and use them to set up 
and promote high technology methods in Taiwan.
International trade today has become increasingly 
oriented toward marketing rather than production.
Collecting and transmitting market information promptly to
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traders presently is weak in Taiwan. The government should 
try to establish a nationwide commercial information center 
for exporters. Through this center, manufacturers and 
exporters could obtain appropriate information that would 
enhance understanding about which kinds of products are 
competitive and which potential foreign markets are worth 
exploiting. It could educate exporters learning to evaluate 
their competitors' strong and weak points and assist them in 
analyzing new market trends.10 8
In view of the changing international market and rising 
wages, the future prospects of Taiwan's foreign trade will 
rely on how rapidly Taiwan can transform its labor-intensive 
industries into technology-intensive industries. Timing is 
a critical factor. The Taiwan government and the 
industrialists must accelerate their pace to improve the 
island's industries in order to upgrade Taiwan's competition 
in international markets.
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Chapter 5 
CONCLUSION
International trade is vital to Taiwan. Throughout 
the years, under a strong and stable economic system,
Taiwan has built a solid foundation for its foreign trade.
In the 1970s two oil shocks and two political shocks— the 
1971 expulsion from the United Nations and the 1979 
withdrawal of U.S. diplomatic recognition— rendered 
Taiwan a terrible blow, but success with the export 
expansion policy has enhanced Taiwan's self-reliance and her 
trade capabilities. Furthermore, it has proven that the 
island's economic and trading achievement can withstand any 
test of radical shifts in the international community.
In the past years the world economic situation has 
undergone some unfavorable changes. Sentiments of 
protectionism have risen to an unprecedented height in most 
developed countries and have adversely affected Taiwan's 
foreign trade. In addition, Taiwan's foreign trade has 
reached a peak and some products, when compared with those 
of cheap-labor developing countries, have lost their 
competitive advantage.
Under economic transition, today Taiwan's foreign trade 
faces a number of problems. The essential question is how
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to identify, develop, and exploit new areas of comparative 
advantage in the future international environment.
Facing such a double challenge from developed countries 
and developing countries requires that Taiwan revamp her 
industrial structure, increase her productivity, and secure 
raw material sources in order to support sustained export 
growth. Taiwan has to internalize her economy and 
liberalize all import restrictions and, thereby, stimulate 
domestic industries toward advanced development. Moreover, 
commodity and market diversification are urgent.
The Taiwan government and business community have 
accumulated substantial experience in adapting themselves to 
new situations at each initial juncture. The government and 
businessmen have, therefore, sufficient competence to take 
appropriate approaches when coping with today's trading 
obstacles. With a concerted effort of the government and 
the people, Taiwan ought to be able to achieve a new 
milestone in the course of her trading development. If 
successful, Taiwan's struggle in international trade will be 
a beacon of hope and a source of motivation to others facing 
the same kind of trading problems.
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